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Abstract
A heterogeneous resource, such as a land-estate, is
already divided among several agents in an unfair
way. It should be re-divided among the agents in a
way that balances fairness with ownership rights.
We present re-division protocols that attain vari-
ous trade-off points between fairness and owner-
ship rights, in various settings differing in the ge-
ometric constraints on the allotments: (a) no ge-
ometric constraints; (b) connectivity — the cake
is a one-dimensional interval and each piece must
be a contiguous interval; (c) rectangularity — the
cake is a two-dimensional rectangle or rectilinear
polygon and the pieces should be rectangles; (d)
convexity — the cake is a two-dimensional convex
polygon and the pieces should be convex.
Our re-division protocols have implications on an-
other problem: the price-of-fairness — the loss
of social welfare caused by fairness requirements.
Each protocol implies an upper bound on the
price-of-fairness with the respective geometric con-
straints.
1 Introduction
Fair division of land and other resources among agents with
different preferences has been an important issue since Bib-
lical times. Today it is an active area of research in the
interface of computer science [Robertson and Webb, 1998;
Procaccia, 2015; Braˆnzei, 2015; Segal-Halevi, 2017] and
economics [Moulin, 2004; Young, 1995]. Its applications
range from politics [Brams and Taylor, 1996; Brams, 2007]
to multi-agent systems [Chevaleyre et al., 2006].
The classic setting assumes a one-shot division: the re-
source is divided once and for all, like a cake that is divided
and eaten soon after it comes out of the oven. But in practice,
it is often required to re-divide an already-divided resource.
One example is a cloud-computing environment, where new
agents come and require resources held by other agents. A
second example is fair allocation of radio spectrum among
several broadcasting agencies: it may be required to re-divide
the frequencies to accommodate new broadcasters. A third
example is land-reform: large land-estates are held by a small
number of landlords, and the government may want to re-
divide them to landless citizens.
In the classic one-shot division setting, there are n agents
with equal rights, and the goal is to give each agent a fair
share of the cake. A common definition of a “fair share” is
a piece worth at least 1/n of the total cake value, accord-
ing to the agent’s personal valuation function. This fairness
requirement is usually termed proportionality. When propor-
tionality cannot be attained, it is often (see Section 7) relaxed
to r-proportionality, which means that each agent receives at
least a fraction r/n of the total, where r ∈ (0, 1) is constant
independent of n.
In contrast, in the re-division setting, there is an existing
division of the cake among the n agents. This division is
not necessarily fair; in particular, there may be some agents
whose allocation is empty. When the cake is re-divided, it
may be required to give extra rights to current holders. In par-
ticular, it may be required to give each agent the opportunity
to keep a substantial fraction of its current value. This may be
due either to efficiency reasons (in the cloud computing sce-
nario) or economic reasons (in the radio spectrum scenario)
or political reasons (in the land-reform scenario). We call
this requirement ownership. Given a constant w ∈ (0, 1), w-
ownership means that each agent receives at least w times its
old value. What levels of proportionality and ownership can
be attained simultaneously? Our first two results (in Section
3) provide an almost complete answer to this question.
Proposition 1. For every constants r, w ∈ [0, 1] where r +
w > 1, it may be impossible to simultaneously guarantee r-
proportionality and w-ownership.
Theorem 2. For every constants r, w ∈ [0, 1] where r+w ≤
1, and for every existing division of the cake, there exists a di-
vision that simultaneously satisfies r-proportionality and w-
ownership. Moreover, when r, w are constant rational num-
bers, such a division can be found with O(n2) queries.
As an example, taking r = w = 1/2, it is possible to
re-divide the cake, giving each agent at least half its previous
value, while simultaneously giving each agent at least 1/(2n)
of the total cake value.
The parameters r, w represent the level of balance between
two principles: large r means more emphasis on fairness
while largew means more emphasis on ownership rights. The
above theorems imply that the re-dividers (e.g. the govern-
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ment) may choose any level of fairness and ownership-rights
that fit their ideological, political or economic goals, as long
as the sum of these fractions is at most 1.
The balance parameters can also be given probabilistic in-
terpretation. Suppose the government wants to do a land re-
form and needs the agreement of the current landowners. Nat-
urally, the current landowners do not want to give away their
lands. However, they may fear that, without land-reform, the
landless citizens might revolt and they might lose all their
lands. If the landowners believe that the probability of a suc-
cessful revolt is 1 − w, then they will agree to a land-reform
that guarantees w-ownership. Theorem 2 implies that, in this
case, it is possible to carry out a land-reform that guarantees
(1− w)-proportionality.
While Theorem 2 is encouraging, it ignores an important
aspect of practical division problems: geometry. The division
it guarantees may be highly fractioned, giving each agent a
large number of disconnected pieces. In many practical divi-
sion problems, the agents may want to receive a single con-
nected piece. For example, when the divided resource is a
time-interval, each agent may need a single contiguous in-
terval rather than a large number of disconnected ones. Can
partial-proportionality and partial-ownership be attained si-
multaneously with a connectivity constraint? The following
proposition (proved in Section 4) answers this negatively.
Proposition 3. When the cake is a 1-dimensional interval
and each piece must be an interval, for every positive con-
stants r, w ∈ (0, 1), it may be impossible to simultaneously
satisfy r-proportionality and w-ownership. Moreover, for ev-
ery r > 0 and every integer k ∈ {1, . . . , n}, there might be k
agents who, in any r-proportional division, receive at most a
fraction 1/bnk c of their old value.
The latter part of the proposition involves a property much
weaker than proportionality: all we want is to guarantee each
agent a positive value. With the connectivity constraint, even
this weak “positivity” requirement is incompatible with w-
ownership for every constantw > 0: a positive division might
require us to give one agent at most 1/n of its previous value,
give two agents at most 2/n of their previous value, give n/3
agents at most 1/3 of their previous value, etc.
Proposition 3 motivates the following weaker ownership
requirement: for every k, at least n − k agents receive
at least a fraction 1/bnk c of their old value. For exam-
ple (taking k = n/3 and assuming all quotients are in-
tegers), at least 2n/3 agents should receive at least 1/3
of their old value. This criterion is inspired by the ”90th
percentile” criterion common in Service-Level-Agreements
and Quality-of-Service analysis, e.g. [Zhang et al., 2014;
Delimitrou and Kozyrakis, 2014]. It can also be justified by
political reasoning: in a democratic country, it may be suffi-
cient to win the support of a sufficiently large majority.
Our following results almost match this relaxed owner-
ship criterion. Formally, the democratic ownership prop-
erty means that, for every integer k ∈ {1, . . . , n}, at least
n − k agents receive at least a fraction 1/dnk e of their previ-
ous value. Democratic-ownership is almost the same as the
upper bound implied by Proposition 3; the only difference is
that in the upper bound the fraction is rounded down (1/bnk c)
while in democratic-ownership the fraction is rounded up.
Theorem 4. When the cake is a 1-dimensional interval and
each piece must be an interval, it is possible to find in time
O(n2 log n) a division simultaneously satisfying democratic-
ownership and 1/3-proportionality.
It is an open question whether democratic-ownership is
compatible with r-proportionality for some r > 1/3.
Theorem 4, like most cake-cutting papers, assumes that
the cake is 1-dimensional. In realistic division scenarios,
the cake is often 2-dimensional and the pieces should have
a pre-specified geometric shape, such as a rectangle or a
convex polygon. Rectangularity and convexity requirements
are sensible when dividing land, exhibition space in muse-
ums, advertisement space in newspapers and even virtual
space in web-pages. Moreover, in the frequency-range al-
location problem, it is possible to allocate frequency ranges
for a limited time-period; the frequency-time space is two-
dimensional and it makes sense to require that the ”pieces”
are rectangles in this space [Iyer and Huhns, 2009].
2-dimensional cake-cutting introduces new challenges over
the traditional 1-dimensional setting. As an example, in
one dimension, it can be assumed that the initial allo-
cation is a partition of the entire cake; this is without
loss of generality, since any ”blank” (unallocated part)
can be attached to a neighboring allocated interval with-
out harming its shape or value. However, in two dimen-
sions, the initial allocation might contain blanks that can-
not be attached to any allocated piece due to the rect-
angularity or convexity constraints. For example, sup-
pose the cake is as the rectangle illustrated to the right.
There are 4 agents and each
agent i has positive value-
density only inside the rect-
angle Zi. The most reason-
able division (e.g. the only
Pareto-efficient division) is
to give each Zi entirely to
agent i. But, this allocation
leaves a blank in the center
of the cake, and this blank
cannot be attached to any allocated piece due to the rectangu-
larity constraint. This counter-intuitive scenario cannot hap-
pen in a one-dimensional cake. Handling such cases requires
new geometry-based tools. Using such tools we can handle
two common 2-dimensional settings (Section 5):
Theorem 5. When the cake is a rectangle and each piece
must be a parallel rectangle, it is possible to find in time
O(n2 log n) a division simultaneously satisfying democratic-
ownership and 1/4-proportionality.
Theorem 6. When the cake is a 2-dimensional convex poly-
gon and each piece must be convex, there exists a division
simultaneously satisfying democratic-ownership and 1/5-
proportionality.
Remark 7. In the interval, rectangle and convex set-
tings, the geometric constraints are mostly harmless with-
out the ownership requirement: when the cake is an in-
terval/rectangle/convex, classic algorithms for proportional
cake-cutting, such as Even and Paz [1984], can be easily
made to return interval/rectangle/convex pieces by ensuring
that the cuts are parallel. Similarly, the ownership require-
ment is easy to satisfy without the geometric constraints, as
shown by Theorem 2. It is the combination of these two re-
quirements that leads to interesting challenges.
Our next result generalizes Theorem 5 to a cake that
is a rectilinear polygon — a polygon all whose angles
are 90◦ or 270◦. Rectilinearity is a common assumption
in polygon partition problems [Keil, 2000]. The ”com-
plexity” of a rectilinear polygon is characterized by the
number of its reflex vertices — vertices with a 270◦ an-
gle. We denote the cake complexity by T . A rectan-
gle — the simplest rectilinear polygon — has T = 0.
The cake below has T = 4 reflex vertices (circled):
Theorem 8. When the cake
is a rectilinear polygon
with T reflex vertices, and
each piece must be a rect-
angle, it is possible to
find in time O(n2 log n +
poly(T )) a division satisfy-
ing democratic-ownership,
in which each agent re-
ceives at least 1/(4n + T )
of the total cake value. 1
1.1 Application: bounding the price-of-fairness
Redivision protocols can be used not only to compromise
between old and new agents, but also to compromise be-
tween fairness and efficiency. Often, the most economically-
efficient allocation is not fair, while a fair allocation is not
economically-efficient. The trade-off between fairness and
efficiency is quantified by the price-of-fairness [Bertsimas et
al., 2011; Bertsimas et al., 2012; Caragiannis et al., 2012;
Aumann and Dombb, 2010]. It is defined as the worst-case
ratio of the maximum attainable social-welfare to the max-
imum attainable social-welfare of a fair allocation. The so-
cial welfare is usually defined as the arithmetic mean of the
agents’ values (also called utilitarian welfare) or their geo-
metric mean (also called Nash welfare [Moulin, 2004]).
A redivision protocol can be used to calculate an upper
bound on the price of fairness in the following way. Take
a welfare-maximizing allocation as the initial allocation; use
1 The guarantee of 1/(4n+ T ) is calculated as a fraction of the
total cake value. However, with a rectilinear cake and a rectangular
piece, even a single agent cannot always get the entire cake value to
itself. Therefore, one could think of an alternative guarantee where
the benchmark for each agent is the largest value that this agent can
attain in a rectangle. For example, we could guarantee each agent
a fraction 1/(4n) of the value of its most valuable rectangle. How-
ever, such guarantee might be much worse than the guarantee of
Theorem 8. The proof in Appendix A implies that the value of the
most valuable rectangle might be as small as 1/(T + 1) of the total
cake value. Therefore, the alternative guarantee of 1/(4n) this value
translates to a guarantee of 1/(O(n · T )) — much worse than the
1/(O(n+ T )) guaranteed by Theorem 8.
a redivision protocol to produce a partially-proportional allo-
cation in which the utility of each agent is close to its initial
utility; conclude that the new welfare is close to the initial
(maximal) welfare.
Without geometric constraints, we have the following up-
per bound:
Theorem 9. For every r ∈ [0, 1], the utilitarian-price of r-
proportionality is at most 1/(1− r).
Note that when r = 1, the bound is infinity. Indeed, [Cara-
giannis et al., 2012] proved that the price of 1-proportionality
in this setting is Θ(
√
n), which is not bounded by any con-
stant. Our results show that by making a small compromise
on the level of proportionality we can get a constant (inde-
pendent of n) bound on the utilitarian-price. The parameter r
sets the level of trade-off between fairness and efficiency.
With geometric constraints, we have the following upper
bounds:
Theorem 10. When the cake is an interval and each piece
must be an interval, for every B ≥ 3:
• The utilitarian-price of (1/B)-proportionality is
O(
√
n);
• The Nash-price of (1/B)-proportionality is at most 8.4.
Theorem 11. When the cake is a rectangle and each piece
must be a rectangle, for every B ≥ 4:
• The utilitarian-price of (1/B)-proportionality is
O(
√
n);
• The Nash-price of (1/B)-proportionality is at most 11.2.
Theorem 12. When the cake is convex polygon and each
piece must be convex, ∀B ≥ 5:
• The utilitarian-price of (1/B)-proportionality is
O(
√
n);
• The Nash-price of (1/B)-proportionality is at most 14.
Note that the first claim in Theorem 10 is subsumed by
Aumann and Dombb [2010], who prove that the utilitarian-
price of 1-proportionality in this setting is Θ(
√
n). We bring
this claim only for completeness. The second claim in this
theorem, as well as the following theorems which deal with
two-dimensional constraints, are not implied by previous re-
sults.
2 Model
2.1 Cake division
The cake C is a polytope in the d-dimensional Euclidean
plane Rd. In this paper we focus on the common cases in
which d = 1 and C is an interval, or d = 2 and C is a poly-
gon. A piece is a Borel subset of C.
C has to be divided among n ≥ 1 agents. Each agent
i ∈ {1, . . . , n} has a value-density function vi, which is an
integrable, non-negative and bounded function on C. The
value of a piece Xi to agent i is marked by Vi(Xi) and it is
the integral of its value-density: Vi(Xi) =
∫
x∈Xi vi(x)dx.
The definition implies that the Vi are finite measures and are
absolutely-continuous with respect to the Lebesgue measure,
i.e., any piece with zero area has zero value to all agents.
Therefore, we do not need to worry about who gets the
boundary of a piece, since its value is 0.
The division protocols access the value measures via
queries [Robertson and Webb, 1998; Woeginger and Sgall,
2007]: an eval query asks an agent to reveal its value for a
specified piece of cake; a mark query asks an agent to mark a
piece of cake with a specified value.
The present paper ignores strategic considerations and as-
sumes that agents answer truthfully. Indeed, in general it may
be impossible to build a cake-cutting protocol that is both fair
and strategy-proof [Braˆnzei and Miltersen, 2015].
The geometric constraints, if any, are represented by a pre-
specified family S of usable pieces. In this paper, S will ei-
ther be the set of all pieces (which means that there are no
geometric constraints), or the set of all intervals, or the set of
all rectangles, or the set of all convex pieces. We assume that
each agent can use only a single piece from the family S.
An allocation is a vector of n pieces, X = (X1, . . . , Xn),
one piece per agent, such that theXi are pairwise-disjoint and
∪ni=1Xi ⊆ C. Note that some cake may remain unallocated,
i.e, free disposal is assumed. We explained in the introduction
why this may be important. An S-allocation is an allocation
in which all pieces are usable, i.e, ∀i : Xi ∈ S.
For every constant r ∈ (0, 1), an allocation X is called r-
proportional if every agent receives at least r/n of the total
cake value:
∀i ∈ {1, . . . , n} : Vi(Xi) ≥ (r/n) · Vi(C)
A 1-proportional division is also known as “proportional”.
2.2 Cake redivision
There is an existing S-allocation of the cake: Z1, . . . , Zn. It
is assumed that the old pieces Zj are pairwise-disjoint and
∀j : Zj ∈ S, but nothing else is assumed on the division. In
particular, the initial division is not necessarily proportional,
and some of C may be undivided.
It is required to create a new S-allocation ofC to all agents:
X1, . . . , Xn. For every constant w ∈ (0, 1), the re-allocation
satisfies the w-ownership property if every agent receives at
least a fraction w of its old value:
∀j ∈ {1, . . . , n} : Vj(Xj) ≥ w · Vj(Zj)
Since w-ownership is not always compatible with r-
proportionality for any r > 0, we define the following weaker
property. A re-allocation satisfies the democratic-ownership
property if, for every k ∈ {1, . . . , n}, there are at least n− k
agents j ∈ {1, . . . , n} for whom:
Vj(Xj) ≥ 1dn/ke · Vj(Zj).
2.3 Social-welfare and Price-of-fairness
In addition to fairness, it is often required that a division has
a high social welfare. The social welfare of an allocation is
a certain aggregate function of the normalized values of the
agents (the normalized value is the piece value divided by the
total cake value). Common social welfare functions are sum
(utilitarian) and product (Nash) [Moulin, 2004]. We normal-
ize them such that the maximum welfare is 1:
• Utilitarian welfare — the arithmetic mean of the agents’
normalized values:
Wutil(X) =
1
n
∑
i∈{1,...,n}
Vi(Xi)
Vi(C)
• Nash welfare — the geometric mean of the agents’ nor-
malized values:
WNash(X) =
 ∏
i∈{1,...,n}
Vi(Xi)
Vi(C)
1/n
The goal of maximizing the social welfare is not always com-
patible with the goal of guaranteeing a fair share to every
agent. For example, Caragiannis et al. [2012] describe a sim-
ple example in which the maximum utilitarian welfare of a
proportional allocation is O(1/n) while the maximum utili-
tarian welfare of an arbitrary (unfair) allocation is O(1/
√
n).
This means that society has to pay a price, in terms of social-
welfare, for insisting on fairness. This is called the price of
fairness. Formally, given a social welfare function W and a
fairness criterion F , the price-of-fairness relative toW and F
(also called: ”the W -price-of-F ”) is the ratio:
supXW (X)
supY ∈F W (Y )
(*)
where the supremum at the nominator is over all allocations
X and the supremum at the denominator is over all allo-
cations Y that also satisfy the fairness criterion F . The
cited example shows that the utilitarian-price-of-proportion-
ality might be Ω(
√
n).
When there are geometric constraints, they affect both the
numerator and the denominator of (*), i.e, the suprema are
taken only on S-allocations. Therefore, it is not a-priori
clear whether the price-of-fairness with constraints is higher
or lower than without constraints.
3 Arbitrary Cake and Arbitrary Pieces
In this section there are no geometric constraints on the cake
or its pieces. We start with the negative result.
Proof of Proposition 1. We are given a pair r, w where r +
w > 1. We show a scenario where no r-proportional di-
vision satisfies w-ownership. In the initial allocation, a sin-
gle agent owns the entire cake. All n agents have the same
value-density and they value the entire cake as 1. In any r-
proportional division, the n−1 landless citizens must receive
a total value of (n−1)r/n = r−r/n. Therefore the old land-
lord receives at most 1−r+r/n. By assumption, 1−r < w.
Hence, if n is sufficiently large, the old landlord receives less
than w of his previous value, contradicting w-ownership.
To prove the matching positive result we need a lemma.
Lemma 13. Given cake-allocations Z and Y and a constant
r ∈ [0, 1], there exists an allocation X such that, for every
agent i: Vi(Xi) ≥ rVi(Yi) + (1 − r)Vi(Zi). Moreover,
when r is a constant rational number, X can be found using
O(n2) queries.
Proof. We first give an existential proof. Consider the set of
all possible cake-partitions. For each cake-partition, consider
the n×1 vector of utilities of the agents. The Dubins–Spanier
theorem [Dubins and Spanier, 1961] implies that the set of all
such vectors is convex. Therefore, there exists an allocation
X satisfying the requirement as an equality: ∀i : Vi(Xi) =
rVi(Yi) + (1− r)Vi(Zi).
Since the Dubins–Spanier theorem [Dubins and Spanier,
1961] is not constructive, we give here a constructive protocol
for creating the allocation Z when r is a rational number, r =
p/q with p < q some positive integers. For every pair of
agents i, j (including i = j), the protocol does:
Step 1. Agent i divides Zi ∩ Yj to q equal-value pieces.
Step 2. Agent j takes the p best pieces in its eyes.
Step 3. Agent i takes the remaining q − p pieces.
(Note, when i = j agent i gets the entire piece Zi ∩ Yi).
The pairs i, j can be processed in any order, even in parallel.
Each agent i is allocated a piece Xi which is a union of
nq pieces: np pieces that agent i took from other agents (in-
cluding itself) in piece Yi and n(q − p) pieces that were left
for agent i from other agents in piece Zi. From every piece
Yi ∩Zj (for j ∈ {1, . . . , n}), agent i picks the best p out of q
pieces, which give it a value of at least pqVi(Yi ∩Zj). Its total
value in these np pieces is thus at least rVi(Yi). In addition,
from every pieceZi∩Yj (for j ∈ {1, . . . , n}), agent i receives
q − p out of q equal pieces, which give it a value of exactly
q−p
q Vi(Zi ∩ Yj). Its total value of these n(q − p) pieces is
thus exactly (1− r)Vi(Zi). The three steps are done once for
each pair of agents, so the number of queries is O(n2).
Proof of Theorem 2. Given a pair r, w where r + w ≤ 1,
apply Lemma 13, with the initial allocation as Z, and
any proportional allocation as Y (a proportional allocation
can be found efficiently by classic protocols such as Stein-
haus [1948], Even and Paz [1984]). By Lemma 13, the new
division satisfies r-proportionality and (1−r)-ownership, and
1− r ≥ w.
Remark 14. TheO(n2) complexity assumes the integers p, q
are constant (not part of the input). If they are considered part
of the input, then the complexity becomes linear in q which
is exponential in the number of input bits. The number of
queries can be reduced using concepts from number theory,
but this is beyond the scope of this paper. See McAvaney et
al. [1992], Robertson and Webb [1998].
Remark 15. Our redivision protocol gives each agent a piece
that is not only worth at least (1− r)Vi(Zi), but also a subset
of Zi (in addition to a subset of Yi). This may be desirable in
some cases. E.g. in land division, old landlords may want not
only a high value but also a subset of their old plot.
4 Interval Cake and Interval Pieces
In this section the cake is an interval and each piece must be
an interval. Again we start with the negative result.
Proof of Proposition 3. We are given an initial allocation Z,
a positive constant r ∈ (0, 1), and an integer k ≤ n. We show
a scenario in which, in every r-proportional allocation, the
value of every agent j ∈ {1, . . . , k} is at most Vj(Zj)/bnk c.
Assume that the valuations are as follows. Each agent j ∈
{1, . . . , k} values his original piece Zj as bnk c and the rest
of the cake as 0. The value-density of j in Zj is piecewise-
uniform: It has bnk c regions with a value of 1 and bnk c − 1
”gaps” — regions with a value of 0. The other n − k agents
are divided to k groups of roughly equal size: the size of each
group is either bn−kk c = bnk c− 1 or dn−kk e = dnk e− 1. Each
agent in group j assigns a positive value only to a unique
gap in the piece Zj (so when the group size is bnk c − 1, each
gap is wanted by exactly one agent; otherwise, there is one
gap wanted by two agents). The following figure illustrates
the value-densities that are positive in piece Z1. The solid
boxes represent the value-density of agent #1; each dotted
box represents a value-density of a single agent in group #1.
In any r-proportional division, each gap in Zj must be at least
partially allocated to an agent in group j. Hence, the interval
allocated to agent j must contain at most a single positive
region inZj — it is not allowed to overlap any gap. Therefore
the value of agent j is at most Vj(Zj)/bnk c.
To prove the matching positive result (Theorem 4), we use
a protocol for fair division of an “archipelago” — a cake made
of one or more interval “islands”.
Lemma 16. Let C be a cake made of m ≥ 1 pairwise-
disjoint intervals: C = Z1 ∪ · · · ∪ Zm. There exists a di-
vision X of C among n agents, in which (a) Each agent i
receives an interval entirely contained in one of the islands:
∀i : ∃j : Xi ⊆ Zj , and (b) Each agent receives a value of at
least Vi(C)/(n + m − 1). Moreover, X can be found using
O(mn log n) queries.
Proof. We normalize the valuations of all agents such that
∀i : Vi(C) = n + m− 1. We aim to give each agent a piece
worth at least 1. The proof is by induction on m. When m =
1, divide the single island among all agents using the Even–
Paz protocol [Even and Paz, 1984]. It finds, using O(n log n)
queries, a connected division in which each agent receives
value at least Vi(C)/n = 1.
When m > 1, pick an arbitrary island, say Z1. Pick the
n′ agents whose valuations of Z1 are the highest, where n′
is chosen such that all these agents value Z1 as at least n′.
Divide Z1 among them using Even–Paz, giving each of them
value at least 1. It can be shown that the remaining n − n′
agents value the remaining m − 1 islands as at least (n −
n′)+(m−1)−1; divide the islands recursively among them.
There are m steps, so the runtime is O(mn log n).
Remark. The fraction of 1/(n + m − 1), guaranteed by
Lemma 16, is the largest that can be guaranteed. To see this,
assume that all agents i ∈ {1, . . . , n} have the same value-
measures — they value the islands Z1, . . . , Zm−1 as 1 and
the island Zm as n (so their total cake value is n + m − 1).
The piece of every agent must be entirely contained in a single
island. If any agent receives a piece in islands Z1, . . . , Zm−1,
then that agent receives a value of at most 1. Otherwise, if all
n agents receive a piece in Zm, then the value of at least one
agent is at most 1. In both cases, at least one agent receives
at most 1/(n+m− 1) the total value.
Proof of Theorem 4. We re-divide the interval as follows.
Step 1. Given the original partial allocation Z1 ∪
· · ·Zn ⊆ C, extend it to a complete allocation Z ′1 ∪· · ·Z ′n = C, by attaching each ”blank” (unallocated in-
terval in C) arbitrarily to one of the two adjacent allo-
cated intervals. This, of course, does not harm the old
values: ∀j ∈ {1, . . . , n} : Vj(Z ′j) ≥ Vj(Zj).
Step 2. For each agent j ∈ {1, . . . , n}, add a “helper
agent” j∗ and assign it a value-density function v∗j :
v∗j (x) = vj(x) if x ∈ Z ′j
v∗j (x) = 0 if x /∈ Z ′j
Use the protocol of Lemma 16 with n + n agents, re-
garding the cake C as an archipelago and the pieces
Z ′1, . . . , Z
′
n as the islands.
Step 3. Give each agent j ∈ {1, . . . , n} either the in-
terval allocated to its normal agent j or the interval allo-
cated to its helper agent j∗, whichever is more valuable.
We now prove that the resulting allocation is 1/3-
proportional and satisfies the democratic-ownership property.
(a) Proof of 1/3-proportionality. We apply Lemma 16 with
2n agents and m = n islands. Each of the 2n agents receives
an interval contained in one of the pieces Z ′1, . . . , Z
′
n, with a
value of at least 1/((2n) + n − 1) its total cake value. This
value is larger than 1/(3n).
(b) Proof of democratic-ownership. We focus on the n
helper agents. First, by Lemma 16, every helper agent j∗
must receive an interval contained in Z ′j , since its value is
positive only in the island Zj . Moreover, by the pigeonhole
principle, for every integer k ≤ n, at most k islands are pop-
ulated by at least dnk e normal agents. Hence, at least n−k is-
lands are populated by at most dnk e−1 normal agents. Adding
the helper agent, these islands are populated by at most dnk e
agents. Hence, the proportional allocation in Lemma 16 gives
these helper agents an interval subset of Z ′j , which is worth
for agent j at least Vj(Z ′j)/dnk e.
Remark. Continuing Remark 15, note that the above al-
gorithm gives each agent an option to take a subset of his
old plot — the one allocated to his helper agent. However,
in some cases the old plot of an agent might become very
crowded. In an extreme case, all n − 1 other agents might
want a piece only inside this specific plot. In such cases, the
value that remains to the helper agent might be as low as 1/n
of the original plot value. To handle such cases, the algorithm
allows the agent to pick another piece — the piece allocated
to its normal agent — if it is more valuable than the share of
the helper agent.
5 Polygonal Cake and Polygonal Pieces
Rectangle cake and pieces
We assume that C is a rectangle in R2. Each piece Zj in the
initial division is a rectangle parallel to C and each piece Xi
in the new division must be a rectangle parallel to C.
The Even–Paz protocol can easily be adapted to this set-
ting, by instructing each agent to make vertical cuts parallel
to the rectangle’s sides. Thus Lemma 16 and steps #2 and #3
in the protocol of Theorem 4 work in this setting too.
The problem is that Step #1, the allocation-completion
step, is no longer trivial. We cannot just attach each unal-
located part of C to an allocated rectangle, since the result
might not be a rectangle. We still need to extend the initial
partial allocation Z1 ∪ · · ·Zn ⊆ C to a complete allocation,
but the number of rectangles in the complete allocation might
be larger than n, since we might have unattached blanks.
Our goal, then, is to find a partition ofC to rectangles, Z ′1∪· · ·Z ′n+b = C, with b ≥ 0, such that every input rectangle is
contained in a unique output rectangle: ∀j ∈ {1, . . . , n} :
Zj ⊆ Z ′j . The additional b rectangles are called blanks. In
Step 3, we will have m = n + b islands and 2n agents, so
the value guarantee per agent will be 1/((2n) + (n + b) −
1) = 1/(3n+ b− 1); therefore, we would like the number of
blanks b to be as small as possible. An example of the input
and output of the allocation-completion step is shown below.
Here, b = 1 since there is one blank — Z ′5.
⇒
We replace step #1 with the following:
Step 1’. Let i loop over the agents in an arbitrary order, e.g,
i = 1, . . . , n. extend Zi in all four directions to the maximum
extent without intersecting the other Zi’s. By construction,
the resulting arrangement is maximal — no rectangle can be
extended any further without overlapping other rectangles.
Akopyan and Segal-Halevi [2016] show that, in any maximal
arrangement, the number of rectangular blanks b is at most
m−2√m−O(1). Plugging this into the protocol of Theorem
4 gives a value per agent of at least 1/(4n−2√n) > 1/(4n),
satisfying 1/4-proportionality and proving Theorem 5.
Remark. Akopyan and Segal-Halevi [2016] prove that the
number m − 2√m − O(1) is worst-case optimal, i.e, there
are arrangements with exactly this number of blanks. How-
ever, they do not prove that the greedy extension algorithm is
optimal in any case. In theory, in some cases, it may be pos-
sible to extend the rectangles in a way that leaves a smaller
number of blanks. This optimization problem is left to future
work.
Convex cake and pieces
The situation is similar when C is convex and the pieces
should be convex. The Even–Paz protocol can operate on
a convex cake, requiring the agents to make cuts parallel to
the each other. This guarantees that the pieces will be con-
vex. In Step #1, a similar challenge arises. We have an initial
partial allocation Z1 ∪ · · ·Zn ⊆ C, where each Zj is convex.
We need a complete allocation Z ′1 ∪ · · ·Z ′n+b = C, where
each Z ′j is convex, every input piece is contained in a unique
output piece, and the number of blanks b is minimal.
Akopyan and Segal-Halevi [2016] prove that, for every ini-
tial allocation Z, there exist a maximal extension where the
number of convex blanks b is at most 2m − 5. Plugging this
into the protocol of Theorem 4 gives a value per agent of at
least 1/(5n − 6) ≥ 1/(5n) in the convex case — satisfying
1/5-proportionality and proving Theorem 6. However, we do
not know how to find this maximal extension efficiently; this
computational-geometric question is left for future work.
Rectilinear cake and rectangular pieces.
There are efficient algorithms for partitioning a rectilinear
polygon to a minimal number of rectangles. A rectilin-
ear polygon with T reflex vertices can be partitioned in
time O(poly(T )) to at most T + 1 rectangles [Keil, 2000;
Eppstein, 2010], and this bound is tight when the vertices
of C are in general position. Our goal is to bound b — the
number of blank rectangles. Therefore, it is expected that the
bound should depend on T , in addition to m.
Indeed, Akopyan and Segal-Halevi [2016] prove that, in
any maximal arrangement of rectangles (such as the one pro-
duced by Step 1’ above), the number of rectangular blanks
is at most m + T − 2√m − O(1). Plugging this into the
protocol of Theorem 4 gives a value per agent of more than
1/(4n+ T ), proving Theorem 8.
6 Price-of-Fairness Bounds
In this section, our redivision protocols are used to prove up-
per bounds on the price of partial-proportionality.
Theorem 9 follows directly from Theorem 2 by taking the
original division to be a utilitarian-optimal division.
The proofs of Theorems 10, 11 and 12 are similar; only the
constants are different. We present below only the proof of
Theorem 11; to get the proofs of the other theorems, replace
the constant ”4” with ”3” or ”5” respectively.
The first part of Theorem 11 — regarding the utilitarian
price — is proved by the following:
Lemma 17. Let Z be a utilitarian-optimal rectangular divi-
sion of a cake C among n agents who value the entire cake C
as 1. Let U be the utilitarian welfare of Z:
U :=
1
n
n∑
j=1
Vj(Zj)
Then, there exists a (1/4)-proportional rectangular alloca-
tion of C to these same n agents with utilitarian welfare W ,
such that U/W ∈ O(n1/2).
Proof. Apply the redivision protocol of Section 5 to the ex-
isting division by setting m = n and treating all n agents
as ”old”. The partial-proportionality guarantee of that pro-
tocol ensures that the new division is 1/4-proportional. The
partial-ownership of that protocol ensures that for every inte-
ger k ∈ {0, . . . , n}, there is a set Sk containing at least n− k
agents whose value is more than max(kVj(Zj)2n ,
1
4n ). Renum-
ber the agents in the following way. Pick an agent from Sn−1
(which contains at least one agent) and number it n− 1. Pick
an agent from Sn−2 (which contains at least one other agent)
and number it n− 2. Continue this way to number the agents
by k = n − 1, . . . , 0. Now, the utilitarian welfare of the new
division is lower-bounded by:
W >
1
n
n−1∑
k=0
max(
kVk(Zk)
2n
,
1
4n
)
≥ 1
n
· 1
4n
·
n−1∑
k=0
max(kVk(Zk), 1)
and the utilitarian welfare ratio is at most:
U
W
< 4n ·
∑n−1
k=0 Vk(Zk)∑n−1
k=0 max(k · Vk(Zk), 1)
Denote the ratio in the right-hand side by NUMDEN . Let
ak = Vk(Zk), so that NUM =
∑n−1
k=0 ak and DEN =∑n−1
k=0 max(k · ak, 1). To get an upper bound on U/W , we
find a sequence a0, . . . , an−1 that maximizes NUMDEN subject
to ∀k : 0 ≤ ak ≤ 1.
Observation 1. in a maximizing sequence, a0 = 1 and
there is no k > 0 such that ak < 1/k. Proof : Setting such ak
to 1/k increasesNUM and does not changeDEN.
Observation 2. A maximizing sequence must be weakly-
decreasing (for all k < k′, ak′ ≥ ak). Proof : if there exists
k < k′ such that ak < ak′ , then we can swap ak with ak′ .
This does not changeNUM but strictly decreasesDEN.
Observation 3. In a maximizing sequence, there is no k >
0 such that 1/k < ak < 1. Proof:2 If 1/k < ak < 1 then
for some sufficiently small  > 0, both ak +  and ak − 
are in (1/k, 1) and replacing ak with ak ±  makes the ratio
strictly smaller than the maximum. Replacing ak with ak + 
makes the ratio NUM+DEN+k ; this new ratio is smaller than
NUM
DEN
so  ·DEN < k ·NUM. Replacing ak with ak −  makes
the ratio NUM−DEN−k ; that new ratio is smaller than
NUM
DEN so
− · DEN < −k · NUM. But the two latter inequalities
 ·DEN < k ·NUM and − ·DEN < −k ·NUM are
contradictory. Hence, the assumption 1/k < ak < 1 is false.
Observations 1-3 imply that a maximizing sequence has a
very specific format. It is characterized by an integer l ∈
{0, . . . , n − 1} such that, for all k ≤ l, ak = 1 and for all
k ≥ l + 1, ak = 1/k. So:
NUM
DEN
=
∑n−1
k=0 ak∑n−1
k=0 max(k · ak, 1)
=
(l + 1) + (Hn−1 −Hl)
1
2 l(l + 1) + (n− l − 1)
<
2(l +Hn + 1)
l2 − l + 2(n− 1)
2We are grateful to Varun Dubey for suggesting this proof in:
http://math.stackexchange.com/q/1609071/29780
where Hn =
∑n
k=1(1/k) is the n-th harmonic number.
The number l is integer, but the expression is bounded
by the maximum attained when l is allowed to be
real. By standard calculus we get that the real value
of l which maximizes the above expression is l =√
2(n− 1) + (Hn + 1)(Hn + 2) − (Hn + 1) = Θ(
√
n).
Substituting into the above inequality gives:
NUM
DEN
≤ Θ(n
1/2)
Θ(n)
= Θ(n−1/2)
=⇒ U
W
< 4n · NUM
DEN
= O(n1/2)
as claimed.
The second part of Theorem 11 — regarding the Nash
price — is proved by the following:
Lemma 18. Let Z be a Nash-optimal rectangular division of
a cake C among n agents who value the entire cake C as 1.
Let U be the Nash welfare of Z (the geometric mean of the
values):
Un =
n∏
j=1
Vj(Zj)
Then, there exists a (1/4)-proportional rectangular alloca-
tion of C to these same n agents with Nash welfare W , and
U/W < 11.2.
Proof. Apply the redivision protocol of Section 5 to redi-
vide the existing n pieces among the n agents. Renumber
the agents as in Lemma 17. The Nash welfare of the new
division, raised to the n-th power, can be bounded as:
Wn >
n−1∏
k=0
max(
k · Vk(Zk)
2n
,
1
4n
)
≥ ( 1
4n
)n
n−1∏
k=0
max(k · Vk(Zk), 1)
and the ratio of the new welfare to the previous welfare can
be bounded as:
Un
Wn
< (4n)n ·
∏n−1
k=0 Vk(Zk)∏n−1
k=0 max(kVk(Zk), 1)
=
(4n)n∏n−1
k=0 max(k, 1/Vk(Zk))
The nominator does not depend on the valuations, so the ra-
tio is maximized when the denominator is minimized. This
happens when each factor in the product is minimized. The
minimal value of the 0-th factor is 1 and the minimal value of
the other factors is k. Hence:
Un
Wn
<
(4n)n∏n−1
k=1 k
=
(4n)n
(n− 1)!
=
n(4n)n
n!
≈ n(4n)
n
√
2pin(n/e)n
=
√
n
2pi
· (4e)n
where e is the base of the natural logarithm. Taking the n-
th root gives U/W < (4e) · √n/2pi1/n. A calculation in
Wolfram Alpha shows that the rightmost term
√
n/2pi
1/n
is
bounded globally by 1.03, so all in all U/W < 1.03 · 4 · e <
11.2 as claimed.
7 Related Work
Partial proportionality
While proportionality is the most common criterion of fair
cake-cutting, it is often relaxed to partial-proportionality in
order to achieve additional goals:
1. Speed: finding a proportional division takes Θ(n log n)
queries, but finding an r-proportional division takes only
Θ(n) queries, for some sufficiently small r ≤ 0.1 [Edmonds
and Pruhs, 2006; Edmonds et al., 2008].
2. Improving social welfare: proportional allocations may
be socially inefficient; efficiency can be improved by decreas-
ing the value-guarantee per agent [Zivan, 2011; Arzi, 2012].
3. Minimum-size constraint: In some 1-dimensional set-
tings, each agent may get several intervals but the length of
each interval should be above a threshold. It is impossible
to guarantee an r-proportional allocation for any r > 0, but
additive approximations exist [Caragiannis et al., 2011].
4. Geometric constraints: For example, when the cake is
square and the pieces must be square, it is impossible to guar-
antee an r-proportional allocation for any r ≥ 1/2, but there
is an algorithm that guarantees a 1/4-proportional allocation
[Segal-Halevi et al., 2017; Segal-Halevi et al., 2015] .
Dynamic fair division
Our cake redivision problem differs from several division
problems studied recently.
1. Dynamic resource allocation [Kash et al., 2013; Fried-
man et al., 2015] is a common problem in cloud-computing
environments. The server has several resources, such as
memory and disk-space. Agents (processes) come and de-
part. The server has to allocate the resources fairly among
agents. When new agents come, the server may have to take
some resources from existing agents. The goal is to do the re-
allocation with minimal disruption to existing agents [Fried-
man et al., 2015]. In these problems, the resources are ho-
mogeneous, which means that the only thing that matters is
what quantity of each resource is given to each agent. In con-
trast, our cake is heterogeneous and different agents may have
different valuations on it, so our protocol must decide which
parts of the cake should be given to which agent.
2. Population monotonicity [Thomson, 1983; Moulin,
1990; Moulin, 2004; Thomson, 2011; Sziklai and Segal-
Halevi, 2018] is an axiom that describes a desired property
of allocation rules. When new agents arrive and the same di-
vision rule is re-activated, the value of all old agents should be
weakly smaller than before. This axiom represents the virtue
of solidarity: if sacrifices have to be made to support an ad-
ditional agent, then everybody should contribute. We, too,
assume that old agents are taking part in supporting the new
agents. However, we add the ownership requirement, which
means that old agents should be allowed to keep at least some
of their previous value. In addition, while their approach is
axiomatic and mainly interested in existence results, our ap-
proach is constructive and our goal is to provide an actual
re-division protocol.
3. Private endowment in economics resource allocation
problems means that each agent is endowed with an initial
bundle of resources. Then, agents exchange resources us-
ing a market mechanism. The classic problem in economics
involves homogeneous resources, but it has also been stud-
ied in the cake-cutting framework [Berliant and Dunz, 2004;
Aziz and Ye, 2014]. A basic requirement in these works is
individual rationality, which means that the final value allo-
cated to each agent must be weakly larger than the value of
the initial endowment (note the contrast with the population
monotonicity axiom). In our problem we do not make this
assumption as it is incompatible with fairness: since some
agents may initially own no land, individual rationality would
mean that they might not receive anything in the exchange.
4. Online division is a setting in which either the agents
or the divided resources are not all available at the time of
the division, but rather arrive in different times. Walsh [2011]
studies the online division of a divisible resource. The moti-
vation is a birthday party in an office, in which some agents
come or leave early while others come or leave late. It is
required to give some cake to agents who come early while
keeping a fair share to those who come late. Aleksandrov
et al. [2015] studies the online division of indivisible items.
The motivation is the food-bank problem, where a charity or-
ganization receives food donations and must decide on-line to
whom each donation should be allocated. In contrast to our
model, there it is impossible to re-divide allocated resources,
since they are consumed by their receivers.
5. Land reform is the re-division of land among citi-
zens. It has been attempted in numerous countries around
the globe and in many periods throughout history. Some
books on land reform are [Powelson, 1988; Bernstein, 2002;
Rosset et al., 2006; Lipton, 2009]. The earliest recorded
land-reform was done in ancient Egypt in the times of King
Bakenranef, 8th century BC. The most recent land-reform
act has been legislated in Scotland in 2016 AD. Balancing
fairness and ownership rights is a major concern in such
reforms [Sellar, 2006; Hoffman, 2013; Wightman, 2015;
MacInnes and Shields, 2015].
Geometric cake models
The most prominent cake-model is a one-dimensional inter-
val, in which case the pieces are often required to be contigu-
ous sub-intervals. Some exceptions are:
1. The cake is a 1-dimensional circle and the pieces
are contiguous arcs [Thomson, 2007; Brams et al., 2008;
Barbanel et al., 2009].
2. The cake is a 2-dimensional territory that lies among
several countries. Each country should receive a piece adja-
cent to its border [Hill, 1983; Beck, 1987].
3. The cake is 2-dimensional and the pieces are rectangles
determined by the agents [Iyer and Huhns, 2009].
4. The cake is 2-dimensional and the pieces must be
squares or fat polygons [Segal-Halevi et al., 2017].
5. The cake is 2-dimensional; the geometric constraints are
connectivity or convexity [Devulapalli, 2014].
6. The cake is multi-dimensional and the pieces are sim-
plexes or polytopes [Berliant et al., 1992; Ichiishi and Idzik,
1999; Dall’Aglio and Maccheroni, 2009].
Many natural 2-dimensional settings have not been studied
yet. For example, the setting studied here, where the cake is
a rectilinear polygon and the pieces should be rectangles, has
not been studied.
It is important to distinguish geometric cake-cutting
from the geometric knapsack problem [Arkin et al., 1993;
Adamaszek and Wiese, 2015]. In the latter there is a sin-
gle value-function that should be optimized. In cake-cutting,
there are n agents with different value-functions, and the goal
is to guarantee each agent a value higher than some threshold.
Price of fairness.
The price-of-fairness has been studied in various contexts,
such as routing and load-balancing [Bertsimas et al., 2011;
Bertsimas et al., 2012] and kidney exchange [Dickerson et
al., 2014]. The price-of-fairness in cake-cutting has been
studied in two settings:
• The cake is a one-dimensional interval and the
pieces must be intervals [Aumann and Dombb, 2010].
The utilitarian-price-of-proportionality in this case is
Θ(
√
n).
• The cake is arbitrary and the pieces may be arbitrary
[Caragiannis et al., 2012]. The utilitarian-price-of-
proportionality in this case is Θ(
√
n) too.
Both papers study the price of other fairness criteria such
as envy-freeness and equitability, but do not study the price
in Nash-welfare. Additionally, they do not handle two-
dimensional geometric constraints such as rectangularity or
convexity.
Several authors study the algorithmic problem of finding a
welfare-maximizing cake-allocation allocation in various set-
tings:
1. The cake is an interval and the pieces must be connected
[Aumann et al., 2013];
2. The cake is an interval and the pieces must be con-
nected, and additionally, the division must be proportional
[Bei et al., 2012];
3. The cake and pieces are arbitrary, and the division must
be envy-free [Cohler et al., 2011].
4. The cake and pieces are arbitrary, and the division must
be equitable [Brams et al., 2012].
8 Future Work
Two-dimensional division , the price-of-fairness and the re-
division problem are relatively new topics, and there is a lot
of room for future research in each of them.
8.1 Handling other geometric constraints
Two steps in our redivision algorithm are sensitive to the ge-
ometric constraints: the allocation-completion (Step #1 in
Theorem 4), and the Even–Paz protocol (Lemma 16). We de-
scribe how these steps are affected by alternative constraints.
1. Convexity in three or more dimensions. The Even–Paz
protocol can easily operate on multi-dimensional boxes or
other convex objects, requiring the agents to cut using hyper-
planes parallel to each other. However, we currently do not
have an allocation-completion algorithm for convex objects,
or even for boxes, in three or more dimensions.
2. Path-connectivity in two dimensions. If the pieces have
to be path-connected but not necessarily convex, then the
allocation-completion step is much easier and no blanks are
created. However, it is not clear how to use the Even–Paz pro-
tocol in this case: when the cake is connected but not convex,
making parallel cuts might create disconnected pieces.
3. Two pieces per agent. Theorem 2 allows an unlimited
number of pieces per agent, while the other theorems allow
only a single piece per agent. We do not know what happens
between these extremes. For example, if the cake is a one-
dimensional interval and each agent can get two intervals,
what ownership-proportionality combinations are attainable?
8.2 Handling other fairness requirements
1. Envy-freeness. In this paper we took proportionality as a
benchmark of fairness. An alternative benchmark is envy-
freeness. Envy-freeness means that each agent values its
piece at least as much as each of the other pieces. Similarly,
r-envy-freeness means that each agent values its piece as at
least r times the value of each of the other pieces. For what
pairs r, w is r-envy-freeness compatible with w-ownership?
With democratic-ownership?
2. Pareto-efficiency. From an existential point of view,
Pareto-efficiency does not add much difficulty. Both r-
proportionality and w-ownership are preserved by Pareto-
improvements. Therefore, if there exists a division sat-
isfying r-proportionality and w-ownership (or democratic-
ownership), then there also exists a Pareto-optimal division
satisfying these properties. However, it may not be easy to
find such a division algorithmically.
8.3 Improving the constants
Our redivision protocol is 1/3 or 1/4 or 1/5-proportional (de-
pending on the geometric constraint). We see two potential
ways to improve these numbers.
1. In Step #2 of our redivision protocol, we add n helper
agents, so the total number of agents is 2n. But in the Step #3,
each agent chooses either its helper or its normal agent, while
the other agent is “wasted”. If we could know the n choices of
the agents in advance, we could employ only n agents over-
all, subtracting 1 from the denominator of the constant (the
constants would become 1/2 or 1/3 or 1/4). We may view
this as a strategic game in which each agent has two possible
strategies: “normal” vs. “helper”. We conjecture that a pure-
strategy Nash equilibrium exists in this game, and it corre-
sponds to an allocation satisfying the partial-proportionality
and democratic-ownership requirements. While finding a
Nash equilibrium is usually a computationally-hard problem,
it may be useful as an existential result.
2. In Lemma 16, we treat each existing piece Zj as an
”island” and insist that each new piece be entirely contained
in an existing piece, i.e, we do not cross the existing division
lines. This may be desirable in the context of land division,
since it respects the Uti Possidetis principle [Lalonde, 2002].
However, , it implies that the resulting division can only be
partially-proportional and never fully proportional(as shown
by the remark following Lemma 16)it may be possible to im-
prove the proportionality guarantees by devising a different
redivision procedure that crosses the existing division lines.
These possibilities invoke the following open question:
what is the highest level of proportionality that is compati-
ble with democratic-ownership?
8.4 Price-of-fairness
It is not clear whether the upper bounds of our Theorems 9-12
are tight.
In particular, for the case of interval cake and interval
pieces, there is a lower bound of Ω(
√
n) on the utilitarian
price of proportionality. However, we could not generalize it
to the price of partial proportionality, and it is interesting to
know which of the following two options is correct: (a) there
is a lower bound of Ω(
√
n) matching our Theorem 10, or (b)
the actual price of partial-proportionality is o(
√
n). The lat-
ter option would imply that partial-proportionality is asymp-
totically ”cheaper” than full proportionality, in social welfare
terms.
Regarding the Nash price-of-fairness, it is known that with
arbitrary pieces, every Nash-optimal allocation is envy-free
(hence also proportional), so the Nash price of envy-freeness
(hence, of proportionality) is 1. However, this is not true
when the pieces must be connected. We do not have a lower
bound for this case.
A more challenging future research topic is to extend
our techniques to other fairness criteria, particularly envy-
freeness and equitability, in multi-dimensional cakes with
rectangular pieces.
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A Fair Division of a Rectilinear Polygon
This appendix shows what proportionality guarantees are
possible when the cake is a rectilinear polygon, the pieces
have to be rectangles (parallel to the sides of the cake), and
there are no ownership requirements. It can be seen as a base-
line for Theorem 8.
Lemma 19. Let C be a rectilinear polygon with T reflex ver-
tices. It is possible to divide C among n agents such that the
value of each agent is at least 1/(n + T ) of the total cake
value:
∀i ∈ {1, . . . , n} : Vi(Xi) ≥ Vi(C)
n+ T
The fraction 1/(n+ T ) is the largest that can be guaranteed.
Proof. A rectilinear polygon with T reflex vertices can be
partitioned in time O(poly(T )) to at most T + 1 rectangles
[Keil, 2000; Eppstein, 2010]. Denote these rectangles by Zj ,
so that:
C = Z1 ∪ · · · ∪ ZT+1
Apply the archipelago-division protocol of Lemma 16 with
m = T + 1. The value-guarantee per agent is at least 1/(n+
m− 1) which is at least 1/(n+ T ), as claimed.
For the upper bound, consider a staircase-shaped cake with
T + 1 stairs. as illustrated below (for T = 4):
All agents have the same value-measure, which is concen-
trated in the diamond-shapes: the top diamond is worth n and
each of the other diamonds is worth 1 (so for all agents, the
total cake value is n+ T ).
Any rectangle in C can touch at most a single diamond.
There are two cases:
(a) All n agents touch the top diamond. Then, their total
value is n and at least one of them must receive a value of at
most 1.
(b) At least one agent touches one of the T bottom dia-
monds. Then, the value of that agent is at most 1.
In any case, at least one agent receives at most a fraction
1/(n+ T ) of the total cake value, as claimed.
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